A recent decision from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania offers insight into cost recovery claims under both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and Pennsylvania's Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”).  On March 6, 2026, in Blettner Avenue, LLC v. Central Uniform Services, Inc., the Middle District denied Defendants Rental Uniform Services, Inc. (“Rental Uniform Services”) and Cintas Corporation (“Cintas”)’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Blettner Avenue, LLC (“Blettner”)’s HSCA claim, shedding light on HSCA’s time limitation provision and the scope of “response costs” under the statute.  On the other hand, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Blettner’s CERCLA claim, finding Blettner failed to comply with national consistency plan (“NCP”) requirements.  The decision provides useful insight for practitioners to consider regarding statute of limitation under HSCA, the scope of “response costs” under HSCA and CERCLA, and NCP compliance under CERCLA.

Background
In 2022, Blettner acquired the property (“Blettner’s Property” or “Property”) across the street from Defendants’ property.  After years of Rental Uniform Services’ solvent use at the Property, Cintas purchased Defendants’ property in 2002 and discovered tetrachloroethylene (“PCE”), and its degradation byproducts were released into the ground and eventually migrated into Blettner Property’s groundwater.  As a result, Blettner was required to obtain a more burdensome individual National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit and to implement enhanced stormwater management practices on its Property, rather than operating under a standard general permit and implementing less onerous stormwater management controls.  Blettner sued to recover those heightened costs.

Understanding HSCA’s Statute of Limitations Provision
One of the most practically significant rulings in this case concerns HSCA’s time limitations framework, which the Court understood to be a question of first impression.  In short, Section 1114 of HSCA permits (1) civil actions for releases of hazardous substances “at any time within a period of twenty (20) years from the date” of discovery of the release and (2) “actions to recover response costs” within six (6) years of the date those costs are incurred.  Although Blettner was safely within the six (6) year statute of limitation, Defendants argued that Blettner's claim was time-barred under HSCA's 20-year limitations period.  The Court rejected that argument.

The Court clarified that HSCA's 20-year period applicable to civil actions for hazardous substance releases cannot be used to bar a response cost claim simply because the underlying release was discovered more than 20 years ago.  Instead, the operative period for response cost recovery is six (6) years from the date the costs were incurred.  These are separate limitations, and a plaintiff need not satisfy both.  For property owners and practitioners alike, this means that long ago discovered contamination does not automatically foreclose cost recovery, the question in such circumstances is when the claimant actually incurred the costs at issue.

“Response Costs” Are Construed Broadly Under Both HSCA and CERCLA
Defendants also argued that Blettner’s costs—obtaining a more stringent individual NPDES permit and implementing enhanced stormwater controls—were not “response costs” because the implementation of enhanced stormwater controls was speculative and the incurred costs were not associated with responding to the release of PCE and its byproducts.  The Court disagreed on both counts.  The Court explained that whether Blettner would incur future response costs remained a genuine factual dispute, not ripe for disposal on summary judgment.  The Court then declined to hold as a matter of law that increased compliance costs driven by a defendant's contamination fall outside the statute’s definition of “response.”  The upshot is that “heightened requirements” and increased compliance costs necessary to keep contamination from worsening may be recoverable as “response costs” under HSCA.  The Court reached the same conclusion under CERCLA, finding that Defendants failed to show as a matter of law that Blettner did not incur “response costs” under the federal statute.  However, Blettner’s CERCLA claim ultimately failed because its response costs were not consistent with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”).

NCP Compliance Is Necessary
Under CERCLA, response costs are only recoverable to the extent they are “necessary” and consistent with the NCP, which “sets forth…methods and criteria for determining the appropriate extent of removal, remedy, and other measures and means of assuring that remedial action measures are cost-effective.”  Parties are required to comply with specific procedural requirements such as maintaining documentation, conducting remedial investigations and feasibility studies, and providing opportunity for public comment.  Blettner did not satisfy these requirements, and the Court granted summary judgment for Defendants on that basis.  The key takeaway, whether you are defending or bringing a CERCLA response action, is to build NCP compliance into your process from the outset, not as an afterthought.  Blettner Avenue shows that courts will not overlook a failure to adhere to the strictures of the NCP.

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