Earlier this month, a federal district court in California certified a class claiming economic injury caused by alleged misrepresentations regarding pet food ingredients.  The class alleges that the pet food advertises its ingredients as healthful when in fact the products contained allegedly harmful chemicals, including PFAS. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: California, Causation, Class Actions, Damages, PFAS, Standing

On July 9^th, 2025, the Eastern District of New York ruled on a series of motions in Suffolk County Water Authority v. Dow Chemical Company, a case brought by the Suffolk County Water Authority (“Suffolk”) against chemical manufacturers for the alleged contamination of Suffolk’s groundwater supply with 1,4-dioxane (“dioxane”), a chemical classified by the EPA as a “probable human carcinogen.”  Judge Gershon issued an opinion allowing most of the plaintiff’s common law tort claims to proceed to trial while clarifying the standard for expert admissibility under recently amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Causation, Contamination, Drinking Water, Evidence, Expert Witness, Groundwater, Negligence, New York, Nuisance, Pollutants, Strict Liability, Trespass, Water

In Borough of Edgewater v. Waterside Construction, LLC, et al., 2022 WL 557903 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2004), Plaintiff Borough of Edgewater (“Edgewater”) brought Spill Act claims relating to PCB contaminated material which was used as fill in a public park project.  At issue was whether Arconic, as a prior owner of the property from which the fill was obtained, was “in any way” responsible for contamination resulting from use of the fill at another property.  The Court held that, because Arconic had no control over the property, and hence the fill, at the time of its subsequent use, it was not liable to the Borough under the Spill Act. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Causation, Contamination, New Jersey, Owner Liability, PCBs, Potentially Responsible Parties, Real Estate, Spill Act

Recently, there has been an explosion of litigation involving per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) contamination.  In SUEZ Water New York Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, et al., No. 20-CV-10731 (LJL), 2022 WL 36489, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022), a federal district court dismissed PFAS related contamination claims against four Delaware corporate defendants:  E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc. (“Old DuPont”), The Chemours Company (“Chemours”), DuPont de Nemours, Inc (“New DuPont”), and Corteva, Inc. (“Corteva”) (collectively “Defendants”).  The court dismissed the Complaint against New DuPont and Corteva due to lack of personal jurisdiction over each defendant.  Although the court found that personal jurisdiction existed over Old DuPont and Chemours, it ultimately still dismissed the Complaint against these defendants due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against each of them. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Causation, Drinking Water, Negligence, New York, Nuisance, Personal Jurisdiction, PFAS, Strict Liability, Successor Liability, Trespass

On April 9, 2019, Judge John Z. Lee of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division denied the City of Evanston’s motion for a preliminary injunction against two utility companies in a RCRA action that sought to compel the utility companies to investigate and remediate polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) contamination in the area.  After a lengthy evidentiary hearing spanning eight days, Judge Lee found that the city had failed to meet its overall burden of proving likelihood of success on the merits, in part because he believed one of the city’s main theories of contamination to be “simplistic.”  (Memorandum Opinion and Order, at *4, City of Evanston v. Northern Illinois Gas Company, No. 16 C 5692 at *19 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2019)). And on May 16, 2019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a similar decision in Varlen Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, No. 17-3212 (7^th Cir. May 16, 2019), excluding an expert witness and granting summary judgment to the defendant because the expert's testimony regarding the cause of contamination was found to be unreliable, having failed to meet the Daubert standard. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Causation, Contamination, Duty to Defend, Expert Witness, Groundwater, Illinois, Insurance, Insurance Coverage, RCRA, Seventh Circuit, Water

In a 2-1 decision last week, the Michigan Court of Appeals declined to dismiss a lawsuit against Dow Chemical in connection with dioxin contamination in the soils of the Tittabawassee River flood plain. Henry v. Dow Chemical Co., LC No. 03-047775-NZ (Mich. Ct. App. June 1, 2017).  Affirming the lower court’s denial of Dow’s motion for summary disposition, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and nuisance were barred by the applicable statute of limitations even though the public was made aware of potential dioxin contamination in the river from Dow’s operations as early as 1984.  The Court’s analysis, which was accompanied by a dissenting opinion, turned on the fact that Dow failed to support its motion with evidence that the floodplain soils on the plaintiffs’ property were contaminated as far back as the 1980s.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Cases to Watch, Causation, Contamination, Damages, Discovery, Discovery Rule, Michigan, Negligence, Nuisance, Real Estate, Residential, Sediment Sites, Statute of Limitations, Toxic Torts

In the 2012 case of New Jersey Schs. Dev. Auth. v. Marcantuone, 428 N.J. Super. 546 (App.Div. 2012), the New Jersey Appellate Division held that a passive landowner who purchased contaminated property prior to the enactment of the New Jersey Spill and Compensation Act (“Spill Act”) was a liable party under the Act even if the owner did not contribute to the contamination, unless it could meet the Spill Act’s definition of an “innocent purchaser.”  This decision gave rise to an entirely new wave of litigation against landowners who, previously, were not thought to be PRPs under the Spill Act.  Last week, however, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey returned some hope to these property owners when it affirmed a Superior Court decision holding that, while a passive landlord is a  liable party under the Spill Act, application of the equitable principles of allocation may result in a finding that such a landlord is nevertheless 0% responsible  for the costs of remediation.   Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Causation, Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Expert Witness, Leases, New Jersey, Real Estate, Remediation, Spill Act

We’ve been following the case of Strudley v. Antero Resources Corp., No. 2011 CV 2218, since May, 2012, when a Colorado trial court dismissed the action following plaintiffs’ failure to establish, pursuant to a Lone Pine order, a prima facie case showing that the defendant, a natural gas drilling company, was responsible for plaintiffs’ personal injuries.  The Lone Pine order required the Strudleys to submit to the Court, before it would allow any discovery, sufficient expert opinions, scientific testing results, and personal medical information to support their claims.  In July, 2013, a Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Lone Pine orders were not permitted under Colorado law and thus the plaintiffs could not be shut out of the courthouse at such an early stage. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Case Update, Causation, Contamination, Discovery, Drilling, Due Process, Marcellus Shale, Natural Gas, Oil and Gas, Procedure, Real Estate, Toxic Torts

Since the United States Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2451 (2011), plaintiffs in contamination cases have struggled to meet the raised bar for class certification.  And that bar was certainly not lowered by the Seventh Circuit in its decision in Parko v. Shell Oil Co., Nos. 13-8023 & 13-8024 (7^th Cir. Jan 17, 2014).  Parko involved a putative class comprised of property owners in the town of Roxana, Illinois, who claimed that their property values had been diminished by benzene contamination of the groundwater from an adjacent oil refinery which had been in operation for nearly 100 years.  In checking off the certification requirements, the district court held that the question of whether the multiple defendants who owned and operated the refinery during the preceding 90 plus years failed to “contain petroleum byproduct [resulting] in contamination to Roxana property” predominated.   The Seventh Circuit panel unanimously disagreed.  Judge Posner, writing for the Court, described the opinion as necessary for clarification of a trial court’s responsibility to conduct a “rigorous analysis” of whether common issues predominate; in doing so, he did not hesitate to take the district judge to task for “treat[ing] predominance as a pleading requirement” rather than an evidentiary one.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Causation, Certification, Class Actions, Contamination, Dukes, Expert Witness, Illinois, Procedure, Real Estate, Residential, Seventh Circuit, Toxic Torts, Water

Last Friday, the Sixth Circuit upheld a $250,000 sanction award levied against the attorneys representing a large group of plaintiffs in an Ohio federal environmental contamination suit, on the basis that plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claims were objectively unreasonable.   The case – Baker et al. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. et al., Nos. 11-4369, 12-3995 (6th Cir., Aug. 2, 2013) – was on appeal from the Southern District of Ohio, which had granted Chevron’s motion for sanctions after plaintiffs had failed to meet the legal and factual burdens for establishing a medical monitoring claim under Ohio law.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) provides litigants with a mechanism to attack claims that are “not well grounded in fact . . . [and/or] not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”  Generally, Rule 11 sanctions are limited to those circumstances where an attorney’s conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Cancer, Causation, Class Actions, Decisions of Note, Federal Procedure, Medical Monitoring, Sixth Circuit, Toxic Torts