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Showing 38 posts in Procedure.

When a public interest environmental rights group or other party appeals a decision by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection affecting a planned project, it should name the permittee as a party on the Notice of Appeal and serve them accordingly. On April 11, 2022, the Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded a case back to the Appellate Division and held that an appellant natural gas company should have been named as a party in the Notice of Appeal and served. See In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), No. 086428 (Apr. 11, 2022). Read More »

Rejecting federal officer removal and federal question removal theories, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District of West Virginia’s remand of a state tort suit against the remediators of an EPA-permitted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) site.  W.V. St. Univ. Bd. of Govs. v. Dow Chem. Co. et al., No. 20-1712, __ F.4th __, 2022 WL 90242 (Jan. 10, 2022). Read More »

This Blog Post was authored by Omar Khodor, a summer associate.

On June 23, 2021, the Ninth Circuit, in directing the lower court to dismiss a citizen’s suit claim under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), held that the CWA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No. 18-35867, 2021 WL 2559477 (9th Cir. June 23, 2021). To abrogate a Tribe’s sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit explained that a statute must convey “perfect confidence” that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 14. It further found that the CWA does not unequivocally do so because Section 1365 – a section explicitly dealing with United States and governmental sovereign immunity – does not mention tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 15-16. Rather, Section 1365 states that “any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution).” 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Although Section 1362(5) of the CWA goes on to define “any person” as a municipality (among other things), and Section 1362(4) further defines a “municipality” as including an “Indian Tribe or an authorized Indian Tribal organization,” the court determined that Congress had not clearly intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because Tribes are not included in Section 1365. Deschutes River All., 2021 WL 2559477 at *15-16. Read More »

On May 17, 2021, the Supreme Court vacated an appellate court decision which had remanded to state court an action seeking to hold petroleum companies liable for the effects of climate change, finding that the appellate court impermissibly restricted the scope of its review of a district court’s order. Although, as noted by the Supreme Court, “[t]he only question before us is one of civil procedure,” the case of BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Docket No. 19-1189 (May 17, 2021) may have a profound practical impact on ongoing environmental litigation. Read More »

In State of Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Products Co., L.L.C. et al., No. 19-1818 (1st Cir. 2020), decided on October 29th, 2020, the First Circuit joined seven sister circuits in holding that the scope of appellate review of remand orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) is limited to the questions of federal-officer jurisdiction and civil rights jurisdiction. And while the holding does not break new ground in light of its consistency, it informs members of industry of the venue in which they will litigate climate change claims based in tort and state law providing environmental rights. Read More »

This Post was authored by Andrew LeDonne, a MGKF summer associate. 

On July 2, 2018, the State of Rhode Island (“RI”) filed suit against twenty-one oil and gas companies in an attempt to hold these organizations liable for climate change impacts RI has and will experience. The defendants (Chevron Corp., et al.) removed the case to federal court. On August 17, 2018, RI filed a motion to remand the case back to state court. On Monday, July 22, 2019, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted RI’s motion to remand. The remand order was stayed for sixty days for the court to consider whether a further stay pending appeal is warranted. Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 2019 WL 3282007 (D.R.I. July 22, 2019). Read More »

On June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, shaking up Fifth Amendment takings claim jurisprudence. Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S.Ct. 2162 (2019). In Knick, the Court held that a property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim at the moment a state or local government takes her property without paying just compensation, and that violation of the Fifth Amendment can be remedied in federal court via a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The ruling overturned years of precedent that held that a plaintiff could not bring a takings claim in federal court against a state or local government until she had first exhausted her state court remedies. Knick specifically overruled Williamson County, the 1985 case which established the state-litigation requirement. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Read More »

On January 4, 2019, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed a Middlesex County trial court order holding that judicial estoppel is a valid defense to contribution claims under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (the “Spill Act”), at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 to 23.24. The case, Terranova et al., v. Gen. Elec. Pension Trust et al., N.J. Super. App. Div. Docket No. A-5699-16T3, involved a dispute between Plaintiffs Matthew and Karen Terranova and their company New Land Holdings, LLC, the current landowners of a contaminated gas station property, against Defendants General Electric Pension Trust, Atlantic Richfield Co., Amerco Real Estate Company, Charles Boris, Jr., Carol Boris, and Edward Wilgucki, former owner-operators at the site. Plaintiffs sought contribution for costs to remediate impacts from leaking gasoline underground storage tanks (“USTs”). Read More »

On September 4, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the Third Circuit, and not the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (“EHB”), has jurisdiction to review Water Quality Certifications issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) for interstate natural gas projects governed by the Natural Gas Act. See Del. Riverkeeper Network, et al. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 16-221, 2018 WL 4201626 (3d Cir. Sept. 4, 2018). The Third Circuit also held that DEP does not violate Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (“Environmental Rights Amendment” or “ERA”) by issuing a Water Quality Certification that is conditioned on obtaining substantive permits. Read More »

Since 2009, the Delaware River Basin Commission (“DRBC”) has effectively placed a moratorium on fracking activity within the Delaware River Basin (the “Basin”), premised on its assertion that any such activity is a “project” over which the DRBC has authority. But in Wayne Land & Mineral Group LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, No. 17-1800, 2018 WL 3233784 (July 3, 2018), the Third Circuit, overturning a Pennsylvania District Court decision, has held that Delaware River Basin Compact’s (the “Compact”) definition of “project” is ambiguous, and that the DRBC may be without authority over fracking. The Third Circuit’s decision creates uncertainty regarding the scope of the DRBC’s authority and the future of fracking and other land use activities in the Basin. Read More »