Subscribe for updates
Recent Posts
- New Jersey Federal Court Dismisses PFAS Consumer Suit Against Band-Aid on Standing Grounds
- Massachusetts Federal Court Concludes that Biopellets Containing PFAS are “Useful Products,” Providing Defense to Superfund Liability
- District Court Certifies 23(b)(3) Class Action Alleging Injury from Misrepresentations That Pet Food Was “Healthy” Despite Presence of PFAS
- Fifth Circuit Upholds TCEQ’s Third Construction Extension for Texas LNG Project
- Sixth Circuit Holds Clean Air Act Requires Compliance with RACT even where Attainment Application is Pending
Topics
- Venue
- State Implementation Plans
- NJDEP
- Pollutants
- Connecticut
- Federal Land Policy and Management Act
- Agency Action
- Loper Bright
- Council on Environmental Quality
- Public Trust Doctrine
- New Jersey Civil Rights Act
- Title VI
- Environmental Justice
- Disparate Impact
- Massachusetts
- Evidence
- Internal Investigation
- Citizens Suit
- FIFRA
- Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
- Georgia
- Major Questions Doctrine
- Lead Paint
- Greenwashing
- Good Faith Settlement
- Federal Facilities
- Statutory Notice
- Oil Pollution Act
- Federal Jurisdiction
- Owner Liability
- Court of Federal Claims
- Ripeness
- Renewable Fuel Standard
- Fish and Wildlife Service
- Greenhouse Gas
- Refinery
- Alaska
- Florida
- National Priorities List
- Vapor Intrusion
- Solvents
- Price-Anderson Act
- Solid Waste Management Act
- Personal Jurisdiction
- Successor Liability
- Potentially Responsible Parties
- Operator Liability
- Federal Circuit
- Environmental Covenants
- National Contingency Plan
- Divisibility
- Apportionment
- Strict Liability
- Water Pollution Control Act
- Public Utilities Commission
- Utilities
- Historic Resources
- Hydraulic Fracturing
- Water Use
- PFAS
- Ohio
- Arbitration
- Alternative Dispute Resolution
- Climate Change
- Auer Deference
- Fees
- Commonwealth Court
- West Virginia
- Forest Service
- TSCA
- Asbestos
- Martime
- Gold King Mine
- New Mexico
- Utah
- Tribal Lands
- Federal Tort Claims Act
- Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control
- Delaware
- FERC
- National Forest Management Act
- Chevron Deference
- United States Supreme Court
- Endangered Species Act
- HSCA
- Alter Ego
- Corporate Veil
- Allocation
- Eleventh Amendment
- Delaware River Basin Commission
- Mining
- Intervention
- New Hampshire
- Property Damage
- First Circuit
- PCBs
- Building Materials
- Groundwater
- Natural Resource Damages
- Brownfields
- Innocent Party
- Brownfield
- Environmental Rights Amendment
- PHMSA
- Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- FOIA
- Effluents
- Sediment Sites
- EHB
- Texas
- Missouri
- Pipelines
- Injunction
- Coal Ash
- Spoliation
- Stormwater
- TMDL
- Safe Drinking Water Act
- Colorado
- Michigan
- Drinking Water
- North Carolina
- Bankruptcy
- Civil Penalties
- Clean Streams Law
- Hearing Board
- Arranger Liability
- Retroactive
- Sovereign Immunity
- Stigma
- Fair Market Value
- Tax assessment
- Property Value
- Damages
- Storage Tank
- Energy
- Fifth Circuit
- Electric
- Indemnification
- Ninth Circuit
- Arizona
- OPRA
- Attorney-Client
- Iowa
- Fourth Circuit
- Discovery Rule
- Eighth Circuit
- Taxes
- Administrative Appeals
- Preemption
- CAFA
- Contamination
- Procedure
- Natural Gas
- Inspection
- Freshwater Wetlands Protect Act
- Residential
- New York
- Natural Gas Act
- Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
- HAPs
- Mercury
- D.C. Circuit
- Hazardous Air Pollutants
- Condemnation
- Takings
- Storage
- Flooding
- Takings Clause
- Fifth Amendment
- Causation
- Spill Act
- NEPA
- Mineral Leasing Act
- Tenth Circuit
- Interior
- California
- Zoning
- Act 13
- Duty to Defend
- Insurance Coverage
- Landfill
- Eminent Domain
- Private Right of Action
- Sixth Circuit
- Illinois
- Water
- Subject Matter Jurisdiction
- Citizen Suit
- Diligent Prosecution
- Arkansas
- Pennsylvania
- Press
- Uncategorized
- Maryland
- Eleventh Circuit
- Navigability
- Montana
- Equal-Footing Doctrine
- Riverbed
- Indiana
- Seventh Circuit
- Breach of Contract
- Public Lands
- Green House Counsel
- Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser
- Enforcement
- Delay Notice
- Equity
- Laches
- CISWI
- Rulemaking
- Consent Decree
- Boiler MACT
- EPA
- Second Circuit
- Declaratory Relief
- Contribution
- NPDES
- Standing
- Medical Monitoring
- Dimock
- Case Update
- Legislation
- Louisiana
- Certification
- Dukes
- CLE
- Decisions of Note
- Privilege
- Work Product
- Expert Witness
- Cases to Watch
- Discovery
- Defense Costs
- Insurance
- Remediation
- Response Action Contractors
- Consultant Liability
- Negligence
- Rapanos
- Army Corps
- Donovan
- Kentucky
- Nuisance
- Class Actions
- Hog Barn
- Trespass
- Odors
- Farming
- Informal Agency Action
- ISRA
- Administrative Hearing
- New Jersey
- Railroad
- RCRA
- Cancer
- Air
- Combustion
- Emissions
- Waste
- CERCLA
- Speaking Engagements
- Federal Procedure
- Third Circuit
- Removal
- Toxic Torts
- Permits
- Clean Air Act
- Title V
- Statute of Limitations
- Cost Recovery
- Cleanup
- Supreme Court
- Superfund
- Tolling
- Statute of Repose
- Multi-District Litigation
- Camp Lejeune
- Due Process
- Mineral Rights
- Clean Water Act
- Wetlands
- Enforcement Action
- Administrative Procedures Act
- Marcellus Shale
- Deeds
- Real Estate
- Exploration
- Drilling
- Leases
- Oil and Gas
- Royalties
Blog editor
Blog Contributors
Under Section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA, a party who has arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at a facility may, like other categories of Potentially Responsible Parties, be strictly liable for response costs. Where the PRP has engaged in the sale of a “useful product,” even one known to be hazardous, is not liable as an arranger unless the PRP has taken “intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., 556 U.S. 599, 609-10 (2009)(“BNSF”). Mere knowledge that there might be a discharge of hazardous substances in connection with the transport or use of the product is not sufficient to impose arranger liability. Id. at 611. As a result, “whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction . . . and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was on Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions. Id. at 610. Just such a “fact-intensive inquiry” was undertaken by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan last week in Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp., Case No. 1:11-CV-483 (W.D.MI. Sept. 26, 2013), one of a number of cases dealing with the recycling of “broke,” or scraps of carbonless copy paper coated with a PCB-containing emulsion produced by NCR from the mid-1950’s until 1971.
In Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP, the plaintiffs alleged that NCR sold, and encouraged others to sell, broke to recyclers rather than dispose of it in other ways because NCR was aware that the recycling process would result in PCB-contaminated effluent, and knew that any other method of disposal would be expensive and difficult. NCR maintained that broke was a useful product which was highly sought after by recyclers and thus it did not “intend” to dispose of any hazardous substance in selling the broke to recyclers.
The Western District Court was having none of that, however. In an opinion detailing NCR’s knowledge of the hazards of PCBs contained in the broke, its failure to disclose those hazardous to its business partners, and its awareness that the recycler’s processing of the broke would necessarily result in the discharge of contaminated effluent, held that “no one with NCR’s knowledge of the situation could have believed that [the] broke was a useful product.” Id. at *20. Specifically, the Court found that by 1969, NCR “clear[ly] and unequivocal[ly]” knew that selling broke to recyclers was “facilitating” the disposal of a hazardous substance and thus not legitimate “attempts to sell a genuinely useful product.” Id. This conclusion was supported, in particular, by the fact that from 1969 to 1971, NCR was “scrambling to find alternative ways of disposing of the . . . broke, rather than selling it to paper recyclers,” an acknowledgement that NCR knew that the broke was a “legal liability, not a useful product.” Id. at 19-21. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP thus stands as a blueprint for other courts to follow in determining whether an entity’s knowledge of the hazardous properties of its waste products, and the manner in which such products would be processed by a buyer, is sufficient to make the entity an arranger strictly liable under CERCLA.
