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Showing 55 posts in CERCLA.

On September 20, 2019, hitting a trifecta of commonly-litigated CERCLA issues, Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Justice of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, partially denied and partially granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in The Premcor Refining Group Inc., v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., et. al., No. 17-cv-738-NJR-MAB (S.D. Ill.). The Court held (a) Premcor had adequately pled fact to withstand a defense that the petroleum exclusion barred the claims; (b) Premcor could not simultaneously plead 107 and 113 claims, dismissing its cost recovery claims inasmuch as Premcor had settled its claims with the State of Illinois; and (c) the contribution protection Apex Oil obtained in its settlement with the State of Illinois included CERCLA claims barred Premcor’s claims. Read More »

On August 22, 2019, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had sufficiently settled its cleanup liability under a settlement agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the State of Indiana, which triggered the plaintiff’s right to bring a contribution claim, but that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s contribution claim had run. See Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Industries Inc., No. 1-17-cv-2565 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2019). Read More »

In a recent decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed that a party who has, without reservation, affirmatively invoked an arbitration provision has waived the right to argue that the provision is unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The case, PolyOne Corp. v. Westlake Vinyls, Inc., No. 19-5137 (6th Cir. Sep. 6, 2019), dealt with a "unique" agreement partially resolving claims relating to the remediation of an industrial site, known as the B.F. Goodrich Superfund Site, in Calvert City, Kentucky. Read More »

This Post was primarily authored by Andrew LeDonne, a MGKF summer associate. 

On July 17, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court’s interpretation of a release agreement between ASARCO and the Union Pacific Railroad Company (“UP”)  to preclude ASARCO's claim against UP to recover cleanup costs for the Coeur d’Alene superfund site (the "CDA Site"). ASARCO LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2019 WL 3216615 (9th Cir. July 17, 2019).  This was the second time that the Ninth Circuit had the matter before it, and dispatched it with few words -- but with enough to remind practitioners of the importance of careful wording of settlement and release agreements.  Read More »

In yet another installment of the long-running Dico case, on April 11, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit unanimously affirmed a district court’s $11 million judgment against Dico, Inc., and Titan Tire Corporation, two related entities of Titan International Inc. United States v. Dico Inc., No. 17-3462 (8th Cir. Apr. 11, 2019). The judgment was based on the finding that the entities were “arrangers” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) when they sold contaminated buildings to an unaware buyer in what the Court determined was an intentional act to rid themselves of environmental obligations to safely dispose of PCBs. Read More »

In an opinion and order released last week, the MDL court in In re Gold King Mine Release denied response contractors’ motions to dismiss. No. 1:18-md-02824-WJ, 2019 WL 1282997 (D. N.M. March 20, 2019) (slip opn.). The 2015 Gold King Mine release sent over three million gallons of contaminated wastewater into rivers in Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah. In the wake of the spill, the State of New Mexico, the State of Utah, the Navajo Nation, and multiple individual plaintiffs filed suit against the mine’s owner, the federal government, EPA, and EPA response contractors, Weston Solutions, Inc. and Environmental Restoration, LLCC (the “Response Contractors”). The court’s opinion, which allows the majority of plaintiffs’ CERCLA and tort claims to move forward, comes on the heels of a similar order denying the Federal Government’s motions to dismiss. See In re Gold King Mine Release, No. 1:18-md-02824-WJ, 2019 WL 999016 (D. N.M. Feb. 28, 2019) (slip opn.). Our blog post discussing that earlier opinion and order can be found here.    Read More »

On January 15, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in Arconic, Inc., et al. v. APC Inv. Co., Case No. CV-14-6456-GW (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2019), ruling that Plaintiffs’ contribution claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Section 113(g)(3) were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. What makes the decision noteworthy is that the Court found that the limitations period began to run ten years before the Plaintiffs entered into the Consent Decree with EPA and the State of California to undertake the remediation giving rise to the contribution claim. Read More »

In an unpublished opinion, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the Government was not liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) or Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) for remediation costs incurred at a former defense site. PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 12-3526, 2018 WL 6168623 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2018). Last year we reported on TDY Holdings v. United States, in which the Ninth Circuit rejected a zero percent liability allocation to the government for remediation costs incurred at a former aeronautical manufacturing plant. In PPG Industries, the District of New Jersey found that the Government’s general wartime control over a New Jersey chromite facility was insufficient by itself to impose liability absent a direct connection between the Government and waste disposal activities. The District Court’s decision highlights a hurdle for private parties hoping to hold the government responsible for cleanup costs incurred at former defense sites. Read More »

Last week, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit resurrected two separate lawsuits filed by residents living near the Willow Grove Naval Air Reserve Station in Horsham Township, Pennsylvania and the Naval Air Development Center in Warminster Township, Pennsylvania, which both seek to have the Navy fund medical monitoring programs for exposure to drinking water impacted by two emerging contaminants – perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) and perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (“PFOS”) – attributable to operations at the two Naval facilities.  In two parallel cases that were joined for appeal – Giovanni et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy and Palmer et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 2018 WL 4702222 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) – the Third Circuit held that the residents’ claims for medical monitoring under the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”) were not barred by the Navy’s ongoing investigation and remediation at the sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), because a request for medical monitoring “does not interfere with or alter the ongoing cleanup efforts.”  In contrast, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the residents’ separate claim that sought to have the Navy perform a government-led health assessment or health effects study, which was barred as a challenge to the Navy’s ongoing response actions at the sites. Read More »

Last week the Third Circuit held that the owner of a remediated site could be liable under CERCLA § 107(a) for environmental response costs incurred before it acquired the property. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Trainer Custom Chem., LLC., __ F.3d __, No. 17-2607, 2018 WL 4844077 (3d Cir. 2018). In its opinion reversing the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in advance of trial, the court concluded that “all costs” in § 107(a)(4)(A) means an owner is “indeed liable for all response costs, whether incurred before or after acquiring the property.” Id. at *5. Our blog post discussing the district court’s decision, 204 F. Supp. 3d 814 (E.D. Pa. 2016), can be found hereRead More »