{ Banner Image }
Search this blog

Subscribe for updates

Recent Posts

Blog editor

Blog Contributors

Showing 38 posts in Clean Water Act.

In order to bring a citizen suit in federal district court under the Clean Water Act, 33 USC  § 1365(a)(1), the plaintiff must first give “notice of the alleged violation” to the alleged violator, the EPA, and the State at least 60 days prior to commencing suit. In  Shark River Cleanup Coalition v. Township of Wall; Estate of Fred McDowell Jr., (No. 21-2060, 3d Cir. August 24, 2022), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in its finding that the notice was inadequate because it had not adequately identified the location of the alleged violation as required by the EPA regulations implementing the statutory notice requirement, but upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit on an alternate ground not reached by the district court – that the notice that was given was inadequate because it did not provide “sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated” also as required by EPA’s regulations. 40 C.F.R. §135.3(a). Read More »

This post was authored by summer associate Reilly Wright

In United States v. ERR, LLC, No. 21-30028 (5th Cir. May 26, 2022), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial for defendants facing subrogation and recoupment claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (the “OPA”).  In 2015, ERR was found responsible for an oil spill originating from a wastewater treatment center that it owned and operated on the banks of the Mississippi River.  In 2017, the United States sued ERR under the OPA for removal costs it had paid from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (the “Fund”) to Oil Mop LLC, a spill-response service provider.  ERR demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied, finding that the relief provided for in the OPA was in the nature of equitable restitution, so its claims sounded in equity, not in law.  However, the Fifth Circuit overturned that decision, holding that such claims were legal in nature and therefore provide ERR the right to a jury trial. Read More »

Can plaintiffs in a citizen suit piggyback on existing governmental enforcement action and enforce the same alleged violation under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)? Yes, as long as the citizen suit does not seek civil penalties, according to the First Circuit in The Blackstone Headwaters Coalition, Inc. v. Gallo Builders, No. 19-2095, __ F. 4th __ (1st Cir. 2022).  The First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that under the CWA, administrative enforcement action by the government precludes only a citizen’s “civil penalty action,” which the Court interpreted to mean an action seeking civil penalties.  A citizen suit seeking other forms of relief, i.e. injunctive or declaratory, however, could proceed notwithstanding the government’s action.   Read More »

This Blog Post was authored by Omar Khodor, a summer associate.

On June 23, 2021, the Ninth Circuit, in directing the lower court to dismiss a citizen’s suit claim under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), held that the CWA did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., No. 18-35867, 2021 WL 2559477 (9th Cir. June 23, 2021). To abrogate a Tribe’s sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit explained that a statute must convey “perfect confidence” that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 14. It further found that the CWA does not unequivocally do so because Section 1365 – a section explicitly dealing with United States and governmental sovereign immunity – does not mention tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 15-16. Rather, Section 1365 states that “any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution).” 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Although Section 1362(5) of the CWA goes on to define “any person” as a municipality (among other things), and Section 1362(4) further defines a “municipality” as including an “Indian Tribe or an authorized Indian Tribal organization,” the court determined that Congress had not clearly intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because Tribes are not included in Section 1365. Deschutes River All., 2021 WL 2559477 at *15-16. Read More »

Less than a month after hearing oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Guam v. United States, Docket No. 20-382 (May 24, 2021), the eagerly anticipated opinion on whether consent decrees and administrative orders that do not expressly resolve liability for claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) nevertheless give rise to a claim for contribution under Section 113(f)(3) of CERCLA. The issue is a crucial one and has been the subject of numerous court opinions because of the short, three-year limitations period for contribution actions. The opinion, which the Court intended to provide clarity in the area, holds that only settlements that release “CERCLA-specific liability” trigger the right to contribution. Read More »

On February 18, 2021, the Court in Lower Susquehanna Riverkeeper, et al., v. Keystone Protein Co., No. 1:19-CV-01307, 2021 WL 632734, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2021), denied a factory owner’s motion for summary judgment based on its holding that the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law (“PCSL”) are not “roughly comparable” statutes. In so deciding, the plaintiffs’ citizen’s suit, alleging violations under the CWA, was allowed to proceed notwithstanding that the defendant factory had settled litigation with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“PADEP”) for the same violations under the PCSL. Read More »

Content for this post was provided by Isabel Teuton, a MGKF summer associate.

In National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Schueckler, 2020 WL 3453939 (N.Y. June 25, 2020),the State of New York Court of Appeals held that the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) exempted the holder of the certificate from complying with the public notice and hearing requirements of New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) even where the certificate holder had not yet met other conditions attached to the certificate. The Court reasoned that since FERC placed no condition on the vested eminent domain power granted with the certificate and had completed its mandated analysis of the pipeline’s effect on the public interest, there was a valid exemption from further review under EDPL 206(A), thus permitting the condemnation to move forward. Read More »

Today, the Supreme Court altered Clean Water Act jurisprudence when it vacated and remanded a closely-watched Ninth Circuit decision which pertained to the federal government’s authority to oversee of the migration of pollution through groundwater to navigable waters. See County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund et al., No. 18-260, 590 U.S. ____ (Apr. 23, 2020). In writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice Breyer presented the central issue of the litigation as “whether the [Clean Water] Act ‘requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source,’ here, ‘groundwater.’” Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted). The Court held that a permit issued under the Clean Water Act is required “if the addition of the pollutants through groundwater is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into navigable waters.” Id. Because the “functional equivalent” standard is slightly amorphous, the Court introduced several factors to aid courts, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the regulated community in making permitting determinations. See Breyer Factors, below. Read More »

Last month, the D.C. Circuit, reversing a lower court decision, held that Guam was time-barred from pursuing its claims under CERCLA against the US Navy for the cleanup of the Ordot Dump on the island. Government of Guam v. United States of America, No. 1:17-cv-02487 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Of particular interest was the D.C. Circuit's determination that a 2004 Consent Decree entered into between EPA and Guam to resolve claims under a statutory scheme other than CERCLA, the Clean Water Act, nevertheless sufficiently “resolved” Guam’s liability for at least some remediation costs, giving rise to a contribution claim under Section 113 of CERCLA, bringing the D.C. Circuit in line with a majority of other federal appellate courts that have examined the issue. Read More »

Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), a TMDL establishes the maximum amount of each pollutant that an impaired water segment can receive while still meeting identified water quality standards. After EPA receives a proposed TMDL from the state, it has a non-discretionary duty to either “approve or disapprove” the TMDL. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). If EPA approves the TMDL, it becomes effective. If EPA disapproves the TMDL, it must produce and issue its own TMDL within thirty days. Just before the close of 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Western District of Washington to compel the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue a temperature total maximum daily load (TMDL) for the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Columbia Riverkeeper v. Wheeler, No. 18-35982 (9th Cir., Dec. 20, 2019). At issue in the litigation was whether the “constructive submission doctrine” applied when Washington and Oregon failed to submit required temperature TMDLs and whether that failure triggered a non-discretionary duty for EPA to issue the TMDL itself. Read More »