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Showing 33 posts in Statute of Limitations.

Less than a month after hearing oral arguments, the United States Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in Guam v. United States, Docket No. 20-382 (May 24, 2021), the eagerly anticipated opinion on whether consent decrees and administrative orders that do not expressly resolve liability for claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) nevertheless give rise to a claim for contribution under Section 113(f)(3) of CERCLA. The issue is a crucial one and has been the subject of numerous court opinions because of the short, three-year limitations period for contribution actions. The opinion, which the Court intended to provide clarity in the area, holds that only settlements that release “CERCLA-specific liability” trigger the right to contribution. Read More »

On March 1, 2021, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio issued a ruling denying in part the summary judgment motion of Defendants Ingersoll-Rand and Trane U.S., against whom Plaintiff FIP Realty Co. brought various claims related to the historic release of VOCs on a site now owned by Plaintiff. See Fip Realty Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Plc, No. 2:19-cv-03291. After acquiring the site out of receivership in 2010, Plaintiff retained several environmental consulting firms and undertook voluntary remediation efforts pursuant to the Ohio Voluntary Action Program (VAP). Six years later Plaintiff submitted a No Further Action (NFA) letter to the Ohio EPA, which in turn issued a Final Order and Covenant releasing Plaintiff from liability at the site as a result of its successful remediation. In 2019 Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking to recover remediation costs under CERCLA Sections 107(a) and 113(f)(3)(B), and to obtain a declaratory judgment under Section 113(g)(2) that Defendants are liable for all future costs. Defendants moved for summary judgment on various issues, two of which are the subject of disagreement among the federal appellate courts. Read More »

Earlier this week the Eleventh Circuit issued a published decision in Pinares v. United Technology Corporation, No. 18-15104, slip op. (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2020), affirming the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Pratt & Whitney, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred. In doing so, the Court held that the personal injury tolling provision in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) does not apply to public liability actions brought pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act (“PAA”) or to claims styled under state law based on injuries from radiation exposure. Thus, the lawsuit pursued by Joselyn and Steve Santiago alleging that Pratt & Whitney was liable for their deceased daughter Cynthia Santiago’s cancer was time barred. Read More »

On August 10, 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgement, permitting plaintiffs’ case to move forward in a Superfund action for contribution. See Arconic v. APC Investment, No. 19-55181 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2020), a case we had reported on here. At issue was whether a settlement between plaintiffs and certain de minimis parties for future potential response costs was an adequate triggering event for the statute of limitations period (against different defendants) in an action for contribution under CERCLA Section 113(f). The Ninth Circuit held that it was not, explaining that in the context of a “judicially approved settlement,” the proper triggering event was a settlement which imposed actual cleanup costs in excess of a party’s estimated liability at the site. Read More »

In late July 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss in a case involving releases of uranium radiation and other non-radioactive waste onto plaintiffs’ property. See Op. and Order, McGlone v. Centrus Energy Corp., et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-02196 (S.D. Ohio, July 31, 2020). Claims involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and the Price-Anderson Act and were dismissed for failing to state a claim, while most state law tort claims for releases of non-radioactive waste were permitted to move forward, the court clarifying that medical monitoring exists as a form of damages under Ohio law and not as a separate claim. Read More »

In MPM Silicones, LLC v. Union Carbide Corporation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that there can be more than one “remedial action” at a site under certain circumstances for the purpose of determining the statute of limitations under CERCLA. Dkt. No. 17-3468(L), 17-3669(XAP) (2d Cir. 2019). The decision clarified a statement in a prior decision by the Second Circuit that had suggested otherwise. Read More »

In a highly anticipated decision, on April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state courts may award restoration damages to landowners who seek, under state law, a more expensive cleanup than that selected by EPA, but as potentially responsible parties under CERCLA they must first receive EPA’s approval of their alternative cleanup plan before they would be entitled to those damages. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al., No. 17-1498 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020). Beyond its fact-specific holding, the opinion’s broader implications may have a significant impact on CERCLA cleanups and litigation going forward.   Read More »

In Frazer/Exton Development, L.P. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a takings claim against the federal government relating to environmental contamination because the appellants, current and former landowners of the site at issue, filed their lawsuit more than 6 years after environmental remediation was complete. Frazer/Exton Development, L.P. v. United States, No. 2019-2143 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2020). Read More »

Last month, the D.C. Circuit, reversing a lower court decision, held that Guam was time-barred from pursuing its claims under CERCLA against the US Navy for the cleanup of the Ordot Dump on the island. Government of Guam v. United States of America, No. 1:17-cv-02487 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Of particular interest was the D.C. Circuit's determination that a 2004 Consent Decree entered into between EPA and Guam to resolve claims under a statutory scheme other than CERCLA, the Clean Water Act, nevertheless sufficiently “resolved” Guam’s liability for at least some remediation costs, giving rise to a contribution claim under Section 113 of CERCLA, bringing the D.C. Circuit in line with a majority of other federal appellate courts that have examined the issue. Read More »

Sometimes a movie can solve one mystery but hold off answering others, leaving viewers eager for the sequel. Legal opinions can be the same, as is the Third Circuit’s opinion in Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, No. 18-3287 (3rd Cir. Nov. 22, 2019). After holding that the limitations period for a contribution action accrues from the date of entry into a non-judicial settlement and order on consent, the Court then sidesteps the issue of exactly what limitations period applies. Read More »