A federal district court in Massachusetts recently issued companion decisions addressing the “useful product defense” in the context of biosolids that contain per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).  In twin orders dated December 30, 2025, the court held that biosolid pellets, or “biopellets”—which are produced from treated wastewater solids and used as fertilizer—are “useful products,” providing a defense to liability under Massachusetts’s analogue to the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

The case, Ryan v. Newark Group, Inc., Civ. Nos. 4:22-cv-40089-MRG, 4:25-cv-40026-MRG (D. Mass.), involves claims brought by residents of Westminster, Massachusetts, who allege their drinking water and land has been contaminated with PFAS due to improper disposal of organic waste at a nearby commercial composting facility.  The defendants include the New England Fertilizer Company and affiliated entities (NEFCO), which produces biopellets from wastewater solids sourced from the Greater Boston area, and Casella Organics, which transported NEFCO’s biopellets to the composting facility.  According to the plaintiffs, NEFCO’s biopellets contain dangerous levels of PFAS compounds, which leached into soil and water at the facility.  The plaintiffs assert that NEFCO and Casella Organics are liable for PFAS contamination under Chapter 21E, which is the Massachusetts statutory analogue to the federal Superfund law, CERCLA. 

In evaluating the plaintiffs’ Chapter 21E claims, the district court observed that the state statute is “the Massachusetts version” of CERCLA, and, accordingly, “Massachusetts courts look to CERCLA case law when interpreting analogous provisions of Chapter 21E.”  Under both statutes, an entity may be liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous substance contamination if the entity arranged to have its hazardous waste transported for disposal or treatment.  And the transporter of such hazardous waste also may be liable for cleanup costs.

The district court noted that “[a]t first glance,” NEFCO would appear to be an “arranger” and Casella Organics a “transporter.”  But under the so-called “useful product defense” established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009), an entity cannot be held liable as an arranger under CERCLA “merely for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination.”  556 U.S. at 610.  Invoking this doctrine, the district court in Ryan reasoned that the biopellets produced by NEFCO are a useful product, made for use as fertilizer, and that NEFCO and Casella Organics contracted for Casella to market these products to purchasers such as the composting facility where they ultimately were deposited.  In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the contract between NEFCO and Casella Organics, emphasizing provisions that describe the biopellets as a “product” and Casella’s role as developing a market for this product.

Based on its analysis, the district court determined that NEFCO could not be held liable as an “arranger” under Chapter 21E.  Likewise, the court concluded that Casella Organics could not liable as a “transporter” of this useful product.  The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims, although NEFCO’s motion was granted without prejudice, given the possibility the plaintiffs could prevail under another theory not barred by the useful product defense.

The district court also addressed the plaintiffs’ various common law claims—including negligence, medical monitoring, public and private nuisance, and willful and wanton conduct—against both entities.  As to Casella, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under any cause of action.  But the court concluded that plaintiffs’ negligence and medical monitoring claims against NEFCO could proceed.  Interestingly, although in its discussion under the useful product doctrine the court emphasized that NEFCO and Casella treat the biopellets as a marketable product rather than waste being sent for disposal, the court’s negligence analysis focused on NEFCO’s production of biopellets that it knows to contain PFAS and its “arrange[ment] for their distribution and disposal.”  In this context, the composting facilities’ alleged improper handling of the biopellets did not break the causal chain “where [NEFCO] should have anticipated the downstream disposal practices and their consequences.”

The district court’s companion orders in Ryan are noteworthy for two reasons.  First, they appear to be the first reported judicial decisions accepting the useful product defense in the PFAS context.  And second, the court’s differing analyses of NEFCO’s liability under a common-law negligence theory versus a statutory hazardous waste disposal framework illustrate the limited scope of the doctrine’s protection.

Share | Email| Print| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Class Actions, Contamination, Drinking Water, Massachusetts, Negligence, Nuisance, PFAS, Pollutants, Water