In June 2026, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (the “District Court”) found a Montclair, New Jersey ordinance prohibiting the use of gas-powered leaf blowers to be a valid exercise of state police power not preempted under the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”).

In 2023, the Township of Montclair’s (“Montclair”) Council (the “Council”) approved Ordinance O-23-31 (the “Ordinance”), expressly prohibiting the use of gas-powered leaf blowers, and setting time limits on when leaf blowers may be used. The Council, in its statement of purpose, found that “the use of gas-powered leaf blowers impairs the health and social welfare, as well as the peace and quality of life of persons residing and working in Montclair.” The Council further found that the use of leaf blowers causes exposure to fine particulate matter, which may have an impact on workers using the leaf blowing equipment, individuals with respiratory conditions, children, and others within the community. The Ordinance defined “gas-powered leaf blower” as leaf blowers powered by gasoline or gasoline and oil blends, or electric leaf blowers powered by generators using a mixture of gasoline and oil blends, or diesel, for fuel. The Ordinance still permitted the use of electric leaf blowers during specific hours of use.

The Plaintiffs in this case consisted of a group of landscaping companies doing business in Montclair (the “Plaintiffs”) that filed a complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance. The Plaintiffs argued that the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution, the Takings Clauses of the federal and New Jersey Constitutions, and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs’ motion for injunction was denied, on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not established that their harm was unable to be redressed by a legal remedy or compensated with monetary damages. Plaintiff’s appeal to the Third Circuit was also denied for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint in 2025 which dropped all but the preemption claim under the Supremacy Clause, arguing that the Ordinance imposes a “zero emissions” standard which is both expressly and impliedly preempted by the CAA. Montclair filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which motion gave rise to the instant action. Plaintiffs argued that Section 209(e) of the CAA expressly and impliedly preempts state and local emissions standards, and that Montclair’s Ordinance unlawfully imposes an emission standard on leaf blower engines. Montclair countered that the Ordinance was not an emissions standard, that the Ordinance was permitted as a means by which it may address public health, safety, and welfare, and that the Ordinance is an “in-use” and a “use and operation” regulation, which is expressly not preempted by the CAA.

The District Court in its analysis found that Plaintiffs’ arguments failed. The District Court evaluated the nature of the Supremacy Clause claim itself, finding that Congress’ intent is generally to preserve state sovereignty, and that a state’s police power is not superseded by a federal act unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” This principle, generally referred to as the presumption against preemption, was persuasive to the District Court, which noted that the Ordinance was a valid exercise of state police power, meaning the presumption against preemption applies “with particular force. . . .” With that framing, the District Court reasoned that Congress did not demonstrate a “clear and manifest” intent to preempt ordinances like the instant one.  It found that Section 209(e) of the CAA does not contain language expressly prohibiting states from regulating conditions of the use of equipment within its borders. The District Court further found that the Ordinance was not an emissions standard impliedly preempted by Section 209(e). In particular, the District Court noted that the ordinance “does not impose a quantifiable emissions limit, require pollution-limiting equipment or after-treatment specification, or dictate engine-emissions criteria” nor did it even reference engines emissions. It was the opinion of the District Court that the Ordinance concerned public health and quality of life, regulating leaf-blowing, “not the engines that perform it.” As a result, the District Court found that the Plaintiffs’ preemption argument was “fatally defective” and dismissed their Amended Complaint with prejudice.

This ruling offers insight into a court’s analysis of what states and municipalities may regulate according to their police powers, even when the outcome of such regulation appears initially to conflict with federal environmental statutes. This ruling also has potential implications with regard to the recent proliferation of municipal ordinances regulating environmental aspects of data center development.

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