Environmental law attorneys are persistently reminded to avoid overuse of acronyms, lest we forget what they mean, and a ruling from the Southern District of California recently provided an example of why we should remember to break these acronyms down to their roots.  The Court’s opinion showed that a PRP is just that, a potentially responsible party, as it held that the United States government was 0% liable for the environmental contamination of a site, even though it was deemed a former “owner” of the facility under CERCLA. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: California, CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Superfund

Back in July of last year, in the case of Hobart Corp. v. Waste Management of Ohio, 758 F.3d 757 (6^th Cir. 2014), held that the statute of limitations for a contribution action following the execution of an Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent (“AOC”) that settles an entity’s liability to the government begins to run as of the effective date of the AOC.  To the extent that anyone might have thought that the Sixth Circuit would reconsider this holding, those hopes have been dashed.  On January 24, 2015, in LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp., ___ F.3d ___ (6^th Cir. 2015), the Sixth Circuit stood fast, finding that it lacked “power to reverse [Hobart,] reversing the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss certain counterclaims. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Contribution, Cost Recovery, EPA, Removal, Sixth Circuit, Statute of Limitations, Superfund

On August 1, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision in Arizona v. Raytheon Co., No. 12-15691 (9^th Cir. Aug. 1, 2014), that may give trial courts some pause before approving future CERCLA settlements.  At issue was whether the trial court failed to adequately scrutinize consent decrees entered into between the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (the “ADEQ”) and twenty-two Potentially Responsible Parties (“PRPs”) allegedly liable under CERCLA for contamination at the Broadway-Patano Landfill Site.  The majority opinion held that the trial court’s deference to the AQED’s judgment that the settlements were fair and reasonable was impermissible, and sent the case back down for a more thorough fairness hearing.   However, the more important aspect of the decision may be that, in dicta, the Court concluded that “[e]ven if EPA had been a party to the proposed consent decrees in this case, the district court would have failed to fulfill its duty to independently scrutinize the parties’ agreements.”  Id. at 21. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Arizona, CERCLA, Cleanup, Consent Decree, Contamination, Contribution, EPA, Landfill, Ninth Circuit, Remediation, Removal, Superfund

In a 7-2 opinion issued today, the United States Supreme Court held that CERCLA does not preempt state law statutes of repose that foreclose causes of action for personal injury and property damage claims asserted after a statutorily-prescribed time period has elapsed, effectively absolving potential defendants from liability.

The case – CTS Corp. v. Waldburger et al, 573 U.S. ___ (2014) (slip op) – involves a 2011 state-law nuisance action against the former property owner, CTS Corp., which in 1987 sold property contaminated with TCE and DCE, which it had characterized as “environmentally sound.”  More than 20 years after CTS Corp. sold the property, EPA informed subsequent property owners and adjacent landowners that their groundwater was contaminated and that the source of the contamination was the former electronics manufacturing facility operated by CTS Corp. on the property. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Decisions of Note, Discovery Rule, EPA, Fourth Circuit, New Jersey, Nuisance, Pennsylvania, Preemption, Real Estate, Remediation, Spill Act, Statute of Limitations, Statute of Repose, Superfund, Supreme Court, Tolling, Toxic Torts

Under Section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA, a party who has arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at a facility may, like other categories of Potentially Responsible Parties, be strictly liable for response costs.  Where the PRP has engaged in the sale of a “useful product,” even one known to be hazardous, is not liable as an arranger unless the PRP has taken “intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.”   Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., 556 U.S. 599, 609-10 (2009)(“BNSF”).  Mere knowledge that there might be a discharge of hazardous substances in connection with the transport or use of the product is not sufficient to impose arranger liability.  Id. at 611.  As a result, “whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ characterization of the transaction . . . and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was on Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.  Id. at 610.  Just such a “fact-intensive inquiry” was undertaken by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan last week in Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp., Case No. 1:11-CV-483 (W.D.MI. Sept. 26, 2013), one of a number of cases dealing with the recycling of “broke,” or scraps of carbonless copy paper coated with a PCB-containing emulsion produced by NCR from the mid-1950’s until 1971.  Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Waste, Water

For decades, it has been the unanswered question – what is the statute of limitations for a claim under New Jersey’s Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11, et. seq. (the “Spill Act”)?  Unlike CERCLA, the Spill Act contains no express statute of limitations for private contribution actions.  Thus, trial courts have been left to fend for themselves and, as a result, have failed to achieve consensus.  Federal district courts have unanimously applied New Jersey’s six year limitations period for actions for damages to real property, while, until Friday, the only state decision was an unpublished trial court opinion holding that there is no limitations period for such claims.  But on August 23, 2013, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, in the case of Morristown Assoc. v. Grant Oil Co., No. A-0313-11T3 (App. Div. Aug. 23, 2013), finally spoke and, in agreement with the federal courts, held that the six-year limitations period applies. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: Cleanup, Contamination, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Decisions of Note, New Jersey, Private Right of Action, Remediation, Spill Act, Statute of Limitations, Statute of Repose, Tolling

The Third Circuit keeps rolling out environmental decisions this month, and while Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), received the lion’s share of press this week (including here), another decision issued the same day, Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 12-2059 (3^rd Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), is also worth reading.  In it, the Third Circuit holds that a party who has resolved its liability to the state for remediation under state law may pursue contribution under CERCLA, which puts the Third Circuit in conflict with the Second Circuit on this issue. Read More »

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On Monday, the Second Circuit issued two opinions in the consolidated case of State of New York v. Solvent Chemical Co., Nos. 10-2026-cv, 10-2166-cv, & 10-23830-cv (2^nd Cir. Dec. 19, 2011).  The first was a Summary Opinion, without precedential effect, which partially affirmed and partially rejected the district court’s method of allocating liability for past response costs incurred by Solvent Chemical Co. in remediating contamination at a site along the Niagara River in New York.  The second, a precedential opinion, reversed the trial court’s decision denying Solvent a declaratory judgment holding two other PRPs, DuPont and Olin Corp., liable for future remediation costs.  In essence, the Court of Appeals held that if the trial court could determine that DuPont and Olin were partially liable for past remediation costs, then it was required to find them liable for future costs, even if the trial court was not then able to allocate those future costs.  From a purely logical standpoint, not a very controversial or earth-shattering decision. Read More »

Share | Email| Comments|  Topics: CERCLA, Contribution, Cost Recovery, Declaratory Relief, Second Circuit, Superfund