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Showing 104 posts in Superfund.

In BASF v. Township of Toms River, No. 002155-2011 (N.J. Tax Court Dec. 5, 2013), the Court was asked to decide, in advance of trial, the proper methodology for determining the assessed value of a large tract of land that had been designated as a Superfund Site, but which contained large portions of uncontaminated and developable land.  While the Township sought to discount the value of only the polluted areas of the property, the owner contended that the pollution discount must be applied to the entire parcel.  And that is exactly how the Court saw it. Read More »

Determining the appropriate Statute of Limitations for claims brought pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601, et seq. (“CERCLA”), is often a tricky matter.  Usually, the issue arises in the context of determining whether a claim is properly brought under Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), for costs voluntarily incurred, or § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), for costs incurred pursuant to a court order or approved settlement, as Section 107(a) claims may be subject to a six-year statute of limitations, while claims under Section 113(f) have a three-year limitations period.  However, in State of New York v. Next Millenium Realty, LLC, No. 12-2894-cv (2nd Cir. Oct. 15, 2013), the Second Circuit turned its attention to a different distinction, the one between removal actions and remedial actions, as Section 107(a) claims “must be commenced … for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal action [and] for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action. . . .”  42 U.S.C. Section 9613(g)(2)(B).  In order to find the claims of the State of New York timely, the Court held that a water purification system in use for over 15 years was nevertheless a removal action and not a remedial action because, among other things, the measures were intended to “minimize and mitigate” damage from contamination and not to “permanently eliminate” it.  Id. at 24. Read More »

The Third Circuit keeps rolling out environmental decisions this month, and while Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), received the lion’s share of press this week (including here), another decision issued the same day, Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 12-2059 (3rd Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), is also worth reading.  In it, the Third Circuit holds that a party who has resolved its liability to the state for remediation under state law may pursue contribution under CERCLA, which puts the Third Circuit in conflict with the Second Circuit on this issue. Read More »

A few months ago, we reported on an interesting Seventh Circuit opinion on CERCLA §107 claims issued in the Fox River clean-up litigation in Wisconsin.  The Fox River clean-up, and the ensuing private party litigation, represents one of a number cases that have arisen from EPA’s efforts to remediate water bodies throughout the country that have been declared to be Superfund sites—including the Lower Passaic River and Newark Bay in northern New Jersey, the Hudson River in upstate New York, and the Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn.  Read More »

Often, the most important concern for a landowner facing a cost recovery action is not liability, but rather insurance coverage.  And then, the question may not be “is it covered” but “how much am I covered for?”  On August 9, 2012, the California Supreme Court issued its opinon in California v. Continental Insurance Co.. No. S170560 (Ca. Aug. 9, 2012), providing some comfort to parties locked in expensive clean-up battles. Read More »

The Fox River clean-up – or rather, litigation concerning the clean-up – has resulted in some meaty written opinions for CERCLA lawyers to chew over, particularly on the issue of apportionment in a post BNSF world.  Friday’s decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. NCR Corp., No. 10-C-910 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) is no exception, with the Court not only tackling divisibility, but also hinting that NCR might have 107(a) claim against other PRPs, an issue that the United States Supreme Court left unresolved in the Atlantic Research decision. Read More »

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued a short but important decision this week concerning the applicable statute of limitations under Pennsylvania law for an insurance carrier’s allegedly improper refusal to accept the defense of its insured.  Wiseman Oil Co., Inc. v. TIG Insurance Co., Civ. Action No. 011-1011 (W.D. Pa.), is an environmental insurance case brought against an insurer for breach of contract and bad faith for failure to defend a CERCLA action.  After answering the complaint, the defendant insurer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the action – filed in 2011 after the insured entered into a Consent Decree to resolve the underlying litigation – was time-barred because the insured’s claims accrued in 2004, when the insurer initially refused to provide the insured with a defense. Read More »

Although CERCLA has been around for many years, courts are still interpreting both its parts and its whole.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has tried to direct traffic between Section 107(a), which permits PRPs to bring cost recovery actions against other PRPs for “any necessary costs of response incurred” by the PRP bringing suit, and Section 113(f), which permits PRPs who have been sued under section 106 or 107(a) or have entered into a judicially-approved settlement with a federal or state government resolving CERCLA liability to bring actions for contribution against other PRPs to recover amounts paid in excess of their equitable share of liability.   Because these two provisions have differing limitations periods, burdens of proof, and allow for different forms of recovery against multiple defendants, the distinction is often significant. Read More »

For the Association of Corporate Counsel, Nicole recently wrote about the decision in Menasha Corp. v. United States Department of Justice, No. 11-C-682 (E.D. Wis. 2012) which should give counsel some pause before communicating with employees of a client’s affiliated entities, particularly in multi-party environmental cost-recovery cases.  Her article can be found here.

We don’t just write, we speak too!  I’m going to be leading a breakfast roundtable discussion on March 6 as part of ICSC’s University of Shopping Centers.  More details are here and please stop by! Read More »