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Showing 84 posts in Cleanup.

On September 14, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that speculative, potential future response costs are not recoverable in a contribution action under CERCLA, even if the party seeking contribution has already made an expenditure for such costs pursuant to a settlement. The response costs at issue in ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co, No. 18-35934, D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00053-DLC (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2020) were part of a cash-out bankruptcy settlement that resolved plaintiff ASARCO LLC’s liability for several contaminated sites. Only a portion of the settlement funds paid by ASARCO had been spent on remediating the site in question, with the rest held in trust to address future potential response costs. Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s allocation of 25 percent of the cleanup responsibility to the defendant, Atlantic Richfield, it vacated and remanded the district court’s decision with respect to the future costs. Read More »

The Federal Tort Claims Act permits claims for monetary damages against the United States for injury or loss of property caused by the wrongful acts of federal employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, this waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by the discretionary function exception, which preserves immunity for claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the discretionary function exception in the context of environmental contamination, finding that the exception does not apply to what can best be described as ordinary negligence in the performance of a site remediation. Nanouk v. United States, No. 13-35116 (Sept. 4, 2020). Read More »

On May 4, 2020, the Third Circuit issued a precedential opinion affirming the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey’s decision that the United States Government (the “Government”) is not liable as an operator under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) for its involvement at a chromite ore processing plant in New Jersey during World Wars I and II. PPG Indus. Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1165, slip op. (3d Cir. May 4, 2020). The decision clarifies the applicable standard for parties seeking to hold the Government liable as an operator for cleanup costs at contaminated former defense sites. Read More »

In a highly anticipated decision, on April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state courts may award restoration damages to landowners who seek, under state law, a more expensive cleanup than that selected by EPA, but as potentially responsible parties under CERCLA they must first receive EPA’s approval of their alternative cleanup plan before they would be entitled to those damages. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al., No. 17-1498 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020). Beyond its fact-specific holding, the opinion’s broader implications may have a significant impact on CERCLA cleanups and litigation going forward.   Read More »

In Frazer/Exton Development, L.P. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a takings claim against the federal government relating to environmental contamination because the appellants, current and former landowners of the site at issue, filed their lawsuit more than 6 years after environmental remediation was complete. Frazer/Exton Development, L.P. v. United States, No. 2019-2143 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2020). Read More »

It has been more than a decade since the United States Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & S.F. R. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009), holding that liability under Section 107(a) of CERCLA is not necessarily joint and several, but in appropriate circumstances can be divisible. And yet, courts still struggle to determine when liability is divisible and thus subject to apportionment rather than equitable allocation, with the latter, joint and several liability, still remaining the go to default. The March 30, 2020 decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, in the case of Von Duprin, LLC v. Moran Electric Service, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01942-TWP—DML (S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2020), is no exception. The Court found that liability for a comingled plume of volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) was divisible, but then applied equitable factors to allocate liability. And, in getting to its final decision, the Court also discussed what costs can be recovered under 107(a), the standard for determining compliance with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”), and what steps a lessee needs to take to avail itself of the bona fide prospective purchaser (“BFPP”) defense. This is going to be a long one, so pull up a chair. Read More »

Last month, the D.C. Circuit, reversing a lower court decision, held that Guam was time-barred from pursuing its claims under CERCLA against the US Navy for the cleanup of the Ordot Dump on the island. Government of Guam v. United States of America, No. 1:17-cv-02487 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Of particular interest was the D.C. Circuit's determination that a 2004 Consent Decree entered into between EPA and Guam to resolve claims under a statutory scheme other than CERCLA, the Clean Water Act, nevertheless sufficiently “resolved” Guam’s liability for at least some remediation costs, giving rise to a contribution claim under Section 113 of CERCLA, bringing the D.C. Circuit in line with a majority of other federal appellate courts that have examined the issue. Read More »

Sometimes a movie can solve one mystery but hold off answering others, leaving viewers eager for the sequel. Legal opinions can be the same, as is the Third Circuit’s opinion in Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, No. 18-3287 (3rd Cir. Nov. 22, 2019). After holding that the limitations period for a contribution action accrues from the date of entry into a non-judicial settlement and order on consent, the Court then sidesteps the issue of exactly what limitations period applies. Read More »

On September 20, 2019, hitting a trifecta of commonly-litigated CERCLA issues, Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Justice of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, partially denied and partially granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in The Premcor Refining Group Inc., v. Apex Oil Company, Inc., et. al., No. 17-cv-738-NJR-MAB (S.D. Ill.). The Court held (a) Premcor had adequately pled fact to withstand a defense that the petroleum exclusion barred the claims; (b) Premcor could not simultaneously plead 107 and 113 claims, dismissing its cost recovery claims inasmuch as Premcor had settled its claims with the State of Illinois; and (c) the contribution protection Apex Oil obtained in its settlement with the State of Illinois included CERCLA claims barred Premcor’s claims. Read More »

On August 22, 2019, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff had sufficiently settled its cleanup liability under a settlement agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the State of Indiana, which triggered the plaintiff’s right to bring a contribution claim, but that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s contribution claim had run. See Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Industries Inc., No. 1-17-cv-2565 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2019). Read More »