Earlier this month, a federal district court in California certified a class claiming economic injury caused by alleged misrepresentations regarding pet food ingredients.  The class alleges that the pet food advertises its ingredients as healthful when in fact the products contained allegedly harmful chemicals, including PFAS.

In Jeruchim et al. v. The J.M. Smucker Co. et al., the class brought claims for violations of California’s consumer protection laws, common law fraud, and unjust enrichment arising from allegedly misleading omissions related to three different brands of pet food sold by The J.M. Smucker Company (“Smucker”). No. 22-cv-06913-WHO, 2026 WL 178565 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026).   Plaintiffs claim those brands were misleadingly labeled as “healthful” despite containing titanium oxide and containing per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) in the packaging, which plaintiffs allege cause undue health risks.  Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Smucker was aware of the harms caused by the presence of those chemicals and abused the public trust by not informing them of the same.  Instead, these pet foods were advertised as providing “100% Complete and Balanced” nutrition, and thus, Plaintiffs allege they purchased them for their pets thinking they were healthy and would not have otherwise done so if Smucker had been truthful as to the presence of these chemicals.

Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all persons in California that purchased any of the three brands of pet food during an approximately 4-year period from November 2018 to December 2022.  The district court weighed arguments on standing, Rule 23(a), and Rule 23(b)(3) before ultimately certifying the class.

Standing
With respect to Article III standing, Smucker argued that plaintiffs could not prove an injury because they failed to show that they actually relied on any allegedly misleading statement when purchasing Smucker’s pet food.  But the district court found plaintiffs could establish injury-in-fact by demonstrating that they are unable to rely on the labeling and will not purchase the pet food in the future even though they would like to, and that they had previously done so.  While Smucker argued plaintiffs have to show either that the PFAS migrates to the food itself or there is a risk of such migration to establish injury, the district court disagreed, emphasizing that the plaintiffs allege an economic injury through their alleged overpayment for the product, which is the quintessential harm establishing injury-in-fact. 

Rule 23(a) Requirements
Rule 23(a) requires that plaintiffs show numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.  The district court found the numerosity threshold was easily met as Smucker sold thousands of units of the pet food at issue during the relevant period.  With respect to typicality, Smucker argued that plaintiffs were atypical because they were “found” by plaintiffs’ counsel, that their claims are “vulnerable to unique defenses,” and they sought a full refund while the class sought recovery of the price premium.  The district court rejected that first argument out of hand, was unpersuaded by the second as Smucker failed to identify the specific “unique defenses,” and concluded that “seeking different reasonable remedies than the putative class does not make named plaintiffs atypical.”  With respect to adequacy, the district court was unpersuaded by Smucker’s arguments that the named plaintiffs had a “startling unfamiliarity” with the case, noting that the knowledge threshold was low and only familiarity with the basic elements of the claims was required.  The court addressed Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement in connection with its Rule 23(b)(3) predominance analysis, noting it would be met if plaintiffs made the “even more demanding” predominance showing.

Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance Analysis
Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs must show that questions of law or fact common to all class members predominate over any questions affecting any individual members.  The district court recognized that plaintiffs’ case relied on an omissions theory.  To prevail, plaintiffs needed to show either that the omission was contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant, or that defendant was obliged to disclose the omitted information. Plaintiffs asserted omissions based on both theories – that the omission of the PFAS content in the pet food packaging was contrary to its representations and separately, Smucker was obligated to disclose such information.

On this first point, the district court concluded that while the alleged presence of traces of PFAS was not contradictory enough to the claim that the product was “nutritious,” a reasonable consumer would be deceived by Smucker’s representations that the pet food was “100% healthy” and the presence of PFAS was “contrary to” that representation.  In doing so, it noted a plaintiff’s understanding that such a representation meant that the pet food would support, not detract from the health of her pet.  The court held “Smucker does not need to explicitly label its products as ‘PFAS Free’ for there to arise an assumption that the products are free of such materials,” particularly where the packaging asserts benefits to health and nutrition.

As to the second inquiry, a defendant only has a duty to disclose when either: 1) the defect at issue relates to an unreasonable safety hazard, or 2) the defect is material and central to the product’s function.  The district court determined that based on evidence presented it is plausible that PFAS could migrate from the exterior to the interior of the packaging, and plaintiffs had shown Smucker had a duty to disclose an unreasonable safety hazard by demonstrating that exposure to PFAS in any quantity is damaging to a pet’s health. Interestingly, in evaluating whether plaintiffs alternatively had demonstrated that the omission was “central to the product’s function,” the court agreed with Smucker that the core function of pet food is to feed the pet, and found plaintiffs failed to show how the presence of PFAS is more than a subjective preference, noting that some consumers may not be concerned about its presence in their pet’s food.  However, because plaintiffs had made the requisite demonstration regarding the unreasonable safety hazard triggering a duty to disclose and that a misrepresentation had been made, the district court determined predominance had been satisfied under Rule 23(b)(3). 

Conclusion
Jeruchim offers insights into how plaintiffs may be able to seek class-wide relief related to the presence of PFAS chemicals in packaging for products alleged to be healthy by those that produce and sell those products.  The court’s endorsement of the idea that a misrepresentation has been made if any amount of PFAS is contained in the packaging of a product is particularly significant. 

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