Subscribe for updates
Recent Posts
- Pennsylvania Federal Court Clarifies HSCA Statute of Limitations and “Response Costs” Under HSCA and CERCLA
- New Jersey Federal Court Dismisses PFAS Consumer Suit Against Band-Aid on Standing Grounds
- Massachusetts Federal Court Concludes that Biopellets Containing PFAS are “Useful Products,” Providing Defense to Superfund Liability
- District Court Certifies 23(b)(3) Class Action Alleging Injury from Misrepresentations That Pet Food Was “Healthy” Despite Presence of PFAS
- Fifth Circuit Upholds TCEQ’s Third Construction Extension for Texas LNG Project
Topics
- State Implementation Plans
- Venue
- NJDEP
- Pollutants
- Connecticut
- Federal Land Policy and Management Act
- Agency Action
- Loper Bright
- Council on Environmental Quality
- Public Trust Doctrine
- New Jersey Civil Rights Act
- Title VI
- Environmental Justice
- Disparate Impact
- Massachusetts
- Evidence
- Internal Investigation
- Citizens Suit
- FIFRA
- Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
- Georgia
- Major Questions Doctrine
- Lead Paint
- Greenwashing
- Good Faith Settlement
- Federal Facilities
- Statutory Notice
- Oil Pollution Act
- Federal Jurisdiction
- Owner Liability
- Court of Federal Claims
- Ripeness
- Renewable Fuel Standard
- Fish and Wildlife Service
- Greenhouse Gas
- Refinery
- Alaska
- Florida
- National Priorities List
- Vapor Intrusion
- Solvents
- Price-Anderson Act
- Solid Waste Management Act
- Personal Jurisdiction
- Successor Liability
- Potentially Responsible Parties
- Operator Liability
- Federal Circuit
- Environmental Covenants
- Apportionment
- National Contingency Plan
- Divisibility
- Water Pollution Control Act
- Strict Liability
- Historic Resources
- Public Utilities Commission
- Utilities
- Hydraulic Fracturing
- Water Use
- PFAS
- Ohio
- Alternative Dispute Resolution
- Arbitration
- Climate Change
- Auer Deference
- Commonwealth Court
- Fees
- West Virginia
- Forest Service
- TSCA
- Martime
- Asbestos
- Gold King Mine
- New Mexico
- Utah
- Tribal Lands
- Federal Tort Claims Act
- Delaware
- Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control
- FERC
- National Forest Management Act
- Endangered Species Act
- Chevron Deference
- United States Supreme Court
- HSCA
- Corporate Veil
- Alter Ego
- Allocation
- Eleventh Amendment
- Delaware River Basin Commission
- Mining
- Intervention
- New Hampshire
- PCBs
- Building Materials
- First Circuit
- Property Damage
- Groundwater
- Natural Resource Damages
- Brownfields
- Innocent Party
- Brownfield
- Environmental Rights Amendment
- PHMSA
- Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
- FOIA
- Effluents
- Sediment Sites
- EHB
- Texas
- Missouri
- Pipelines
- Injunction
- Coal Ash
- Spoliation
- TMDL
- Stormwater
- Safe Drinking Water Act
- Colorado
- Michigan
- Drinking Water
- North Carolina
- Bankruptcy
- Hearing Board
- Civil Penalties
- Clean Streams Law
- Arranger Liability
- Retroactive
- Sovereign Immunity
- Stigma
- Fair Market Value
- Damages
- Tax assessment
- Property Value
- Storage Tank
- Indemnification
- Energy
- Fifth Circuit
- Electric
- Arizona
- Ninth Circuit
- Attorney-Client
- OPRA
- Iowa
- Discovery Rule
- Fourth Circuit
- Eighth Circuit
- Taxes
- Administrative Appeals
- Preemption
- CAFA
- Natural Gas
- Contamination
- Procedure
- Residential
- Inspection
- Freshwater Wetlands Protect Act
- New York
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
- Natural Gas Act
- Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
- Mercury
- D.C. Circuit
- Hazardous Air Pollutants
- HAPs
- Condemnation
- Takings
- Storage
- Fifth Amendment
- Flooding
- Takings Clause
- Spill Act
- Causation
- NEPA
- Interior
- Mineral Leasing Act
- Tenth Circuit
- California
- Zoning
- Act 13
- Duty to Defend
- Insurance Coverage
- Landfill
- Eminent Domain
- Private Right of Action
- Sixth Circuit
- Water
- Illinois
- Subject Matter Jurisdiction
- Citizen Suit
- Diligent Prosecution
- Arkansas
- Pennsylvania
- Press
- Uncategorized
- Maryland
- Eleventh Circuit
- Navigability
- Montana
- Equal-Footing Doctrine
- Riverbed
- Indiana
- Seventh Circuit
- Breach of Contract
- Public Lands
- Green House Counsel
- Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser
- Enforcement
- Delay Notice
- Equity
- Laches
- CISWI
- Rulemaking
- Consent Decree
- Boiler MACT
- EPA
- Second Circuit
- Declaratory Relief
- Contribution
- NPDES
- Standing
- Medical Monitoring
- Dimock
- Case Update
- Legislation
- Dukes
- Certification
- Louisiana
- CLE
- Privilege
- Work Product
- Expert Witness
- Cases to Watch
- Discovery
- Decisions of Note
- Insurance
- Defense Costs
- Consultant Liability
- Negligence
- Response Action Contractors
- Remediation
- Rapanos
- Army Corps
- Donovan
- Farming
- Kentucky
- Nuisance
- Hog Barn
- Trespass
- Odors
- Class Actions
- ISRA
- Informal Agency Action
- Administrative Hearing
- New Jersey
- Waste
- RCRA
- Emissions
- Cancer
- Air
- Combustion
- Railroad
- CERCLA
- Speaking Engagements
- Federal Procedure
- Third Circuit
- Removal
- Toxic Torts
- Statute of Limitations
- Title V
- Permits
- Clean Air Act
- Cleanup
- Cost Recovery
- Superfund
- Supreme Court
- Multi-District Litigation
- Camp Lejeune
- Tolling
- Statute of Repose
- Clean Water Act
- Wetlands
- Enforcement Action
- Administrative Procedures Act
- Marcellus Shale
- Deeds
- Due Process
- Mineral Rights
- Exploration
- Drilling
- Leases
- Oil and Gas
- Royalties
- Real Estate
Blog editor
Blog Contributors
In a matter of first impression in Delaware, the Delaware Superior Court recently held that the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (“DNREC”) does not have authority under its cease and desist powers to mandate that an alleged violator take affirmative corrective action. See Del. v. McGinnis Auto & Mobile Home Salvage, LLC, K17A-09-001 JJC (Del. Super. Feb. 21, 2019). The court decided that when DNREC seeks to require a violator to take affirmative action, DNREC must obtain appropriate injunctive relief in Delaware’s Court of Chancery.
The case related to alleged environmental violations by McGinnis Auto & Mobile Home Salvage, LLC (“McGinnis”). DNREC had cited McGinnis for improperly storing solid waste and operating a materials recovery facility without a permit. After issuing a series of violations against McGinnis, DNREC’s Secretary issued Secretary’s Order No. 2016-WH-0031 (the “Order”) pursuant to its cease and desist powers under 7 Del. C. § 6018. The Order required McGinnis to immediately cease and desist any operations that involved creating and storing solid wastes, but the Order also purported to impose affirmative duties on McGinnis. Specifically, McGinnis was ordered to, among other things, remove all solid wastes from the site and provide certain information to DNREC, including a detailed explanation of McGinnis’s procedures for handling, disposing, and storing materials removed or within from mobile homes.
On appeal before the Superior Court, McGinnis contended that DNREC’s Secretary lacked authority to impose such affirmative duties on an alleged violator absent a court order and the court agreed. The court looked to the Secretary’s enumerated statutory enforcement powers to determine whether he was authorized by the General Assembly to issue mandatory injunctions. Section 6018, the provision at issue, provides that the Secretary has the authority to issue a “cease and desist” order for a violation of “any rule, regulation or order or permit condition or provision of this Chapter.” In holding that this provision did not authorize orders requiring affirmative correction action, the court relied on the fact that the common, ordinary meaning of the words “cease” and “desist” was “to stop.” Further, the court emphasized that, among his other enforcement powers, the Secretary was authorized to file for temporary restraining orders or permanent injunctions in the Court of Chancery. See 7 Del. C. § 6005(b)(2). The court reasoned that such an enumerated power would be rendered meaningless if the Secretary could merely order mandatory injunctive relief on his own.
It is important to note that the court’s holding addressed only whether the Secretary has the authority to use cease and desist powers to order affirmative corrective action; the court did not hold that the Secretary lacks all authority to mandate affirmative corrective action. The court noted, for example, that the Secretary has authority to order corrective action in “limited areas” such as in the event of an imminent hazard caused by releases of hazardous waste.
Given the case's implications, it will be interesting to monitor whether DNREC appeals the court’s decision to Delaware’s Supreme Court.
