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Showing 105 posts in CERCLA.

On August 19, 2022, a magistrate judge of the Colorado District Court held that contribution-defendants cannot assert their own contribution claims under section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) because they are only liable for their fair share of response costs.  Atlantic Richfield Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., No. 20-cv-00234-NYW-KLM, 2022 WL 3577261, at *6 (D. Colo. Aug. 19, 2022). The magistrate judge’s analysis resolved questions for potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) seeking to assert contribution claims against other PRPs based on a claim of inequitable distribution of common liability in a 113(f) action. Id. at *4. Read More »

Stanford University can proceed with its lawsuit against HP Inc. and Agilent Technologies, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ruled on September 19, 2022, holding that because certain soil contamination was a “continuous” or abatable nuisance or trespass, Stanford’s nuisance and trespass claims were not time barred and could continue.  Accordingly, the court denied HP and Agilent’s motion for summary judgment on Stanford’s nuisance and trespass claims. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-01199 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 19, 2022). Read More »

Before neighboring property owners can intervene to challenge a consent decree in a remediation action, they must establish Article III standing. On August 5, 2022, The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and held that neighboring property owners of a chemical plant undergoing environmental remediation lacked constitutional standing to intervene to oppose an amended consent decree and remedial action plan. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., Slip Op. No. 20-2786 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2022). The court reasoned that the entry of the amended consent decree was not a causal link of the proposed intervenors’ harm because it did not require the chemical plant to clean-up chlorinated volatile organic compounds (CVOCs) and perchloroethylene (PCE) and therefore did not alter the chemical plant’s preexisting duties regarding PCE. Id. Read More »

This post was authored by summer associate Kelly Hanna.

In Daikin Applied Americas, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) by holding that a groundwater plume can be listed as a Superfund Site on the National Priorities List (“NPL”) pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., even if the sources of contamination are not clearly identified. No. 20-1479, 2022 WL 2565083 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2022). The Court also held that substantial evidence exists to support aquifer interconnectivity so long as observed releases occur at each aquifer. Thus, EPA’s decision to list a “groundwater plume with no identified source” that spanned multiple aquifers in an area southwest of Minneapolis, Minnesota on the NPL survived both arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence challenges. Read More »

On May 18, 2022 in York et al. v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Guidance and Electronics Co. Inc. et al., No. 21-cv-03251 (W.D. Mo.), a Missouri federal court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint alleging negligence, nuisance and trespass from alleged groundwater contamination, finding the claims were preempted by an existing consent decree. Read More »

In Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corporation, the Sixth Circuit confronted a novel question concerning CERCLA’s statutes of limitations: whether a bare declaratory judgment on liability triggers the Section 113(g)(3) three-year limitations period for a contribution claim brought under Section 113(f)(1). The first circuit court to address this issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. Read More »

There are surprisingly few cases addressing whether, for an entity to be liable as an arranger under CERCLA, it must have known that the disposed substance was dangerous or hazardous. On March 10, 2022, in City of Las Cruces and Dona Ana County v. The Lofts at Alameda, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico became the third federal district court to answer this question directly.

Two local government entities sued American Linen for cost recovery and contribution, alleging its decades-long operation of dry cleaning facilities caused them to incur costs to remediate a plume of contaminated groundwater. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that American Linen instructed its employees to dispose of PCE-laden wastes off site and that it contracted with a truck hauler to transport these wastes to a dump site three miles away. American Linen moved to dismiss, arguing principally that at the time of disposal, it did not know the wastes were hazardous substances. Read More »

Rejecting federal officer removal and federal question removal theories, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District of West Virginia’s remand of a state tort suit against the remediators of an EPA-permitted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) site.  W.V. St. Univ. Bd. of Govs. v. Dow Chem. Co. et al., No. 20-1712, __ F.4th __, 2022 WL 90242 (Jan. 10, 2022). Read More »

On December 2, 2021, addressing issues related to the definition of “disposal” and compliance with the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) in a claim brought under Section 107 of CERCLA, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied both Plaintiff Stanford University’s (“Stanford”) motion for summary judgment and Defendant Agilent Technologies, Inc.’s (“Agilent”) cross motion for summary judgment. See Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., Slip Op. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2021). The Court denied Stanford’s motion because there was a genuine dispute about whether HP spread PCB contaminated soil over uncontaminated areas of Stanford’s property and Stanford failed to show that it incurred costs consistent with the NCP. Id.  The court denied HP’s cross motion because, although incurred in connection with redevelopment of the property, Stanford’s clean-up costs were “necessary” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) and, separately, because a genuine dispute existed as to whether Stanford consented to the disposal of hazardous material on its property. Id. Read More »

On November 17, 2021, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a decision of the lower court that the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) was prima facie liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., that it could not avail itself of the contiguous property owner defense, and that the selected response action was not arbitrary or capricious.  The decision is particularly noteworthy in that the only identified contamination was in the groundwater under PRIDCO’s property, with no evidence that the source of the contamination was any activity on PRIDCO’s property.  Nevertheless, the Court held that because the movement of groundwater constitute a continuous “release,” CERCLA liability attached. Read More »