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Showing 16 posts in Clean Air Act.

Last week, a federal court in the Central District of Illinois held the owner and operator of a coal-fired power plant liable for violations of the Clean Air Act for exceeding particulate matter emission thresholds in the plant’s state operating permit.  NRDC v. Ill. Power Res., LLC, No. 13-cv-1181, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111976 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016).  The court found that the plaintiffs—three environmental advocacy organizations who filed suit under the citizen suit provision of the CAA—had standing to sue the plant because certain of their individual members suffered injury-in-fact where emitted pollutants that “could cause harm” were present in the witnesses’ general geographic area and the witnesses’ pleasure was somehow diminished by the presence of the pollutants, even where the witnesses could not point to an objective effect of the alleged violation. Read More »

Several years ago we reported on Community Action & Environmental Justice v. Union Pacific Corporation, in which a California District Court held the dispersion into the air of particulate matter that reaches the ground or water did not constitute a “disposal” subject to RCRA but, instead, was subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.  That District Court opinion was affirmed in 2014, in Community Action & Environmental Justice v. Union Pacific Corporation, 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).  Yesterday, in the case of Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, No. 15-35228 (9th Cir. July 27, 2016), the Ninth Circuit expanded this analysis of the relative roles of our environmental laws by holding that a party who disperses air pollutants that eventually settle into the ground or water are not arrangers liable under CERCLA as they have not “disposed of” hazardous substances under the Act. Read More »

Last week, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a Sierra Club citizen suit against a coal-fired power plant for an alleged permitting violation of the Clean Air Act, finding that the Sierra Club’s claims were time-barred.  In the case, Sierra Club v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 14-7065 (10th Cir. March 8, 2016), the court held that the Sierra Club’s claims for civil penalties were statutorily time-barred because they were brought more than five years after the power plant began its unpermitted modification of a boiler, an action which the Sierra Club claims violated the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program under the Clean Air Act.  The court also affirmed dismissal of the group’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because those legal claims were predicated on the same facts as the time-barred civil penalties.  The court’s interpretation of the statute of limitations as applied to the PSD program is consistent with a 2011 district court decision in the 3rd Circuit, United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., et al., which we reported on here. Read More »

Yesterday in two parallel class action interlocutory appeals, the Sixth Circuit joined the Third Circuit in holding that the Clean Air Act does not preempt state common law tort claims related to air pollution.  The first case, Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., involved excess ethanol emissions from Johnny Walker and J&B brand whiskey distilleries located in Louisville, Kentucky that allegedly caused the growth of a specific type of mold on neighboring properties.  The proposed class of local property owners asserted claims for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and injunctive relief, relying on violations of a local ordinance that prohibited air pollution which caused “injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the public.”  The second case, Little v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., involved dust and coal ash emissions from a coal-fired power plant which effected local residents, and which were the subject of multiple notices of violation issued to the power company.  The class action claims in Little included claims for violations of the federal Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as well as state common law claims for nuisance, trespass, negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence.  In both cases, United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky allowed the common law claims to survive defendants’ motions to dismiss, ruling that the common law claims were not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act.   Read More »

Last week, in the case of Maroz v. Arcelormittal Monessen LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140660 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2015), a judge of the Western District of Pennsylvania declined to dismiss a proposed class action in which residents living near ArcellorMittal’s coke plant in Monessen, Pennsylvania alleged that noxious odors and air particulates from the plant polluted their properties.  After allowing the residents to amend their original complaint, U.S. District Judge Arthur J. Schwab found that the residents adequately pled the state common law tort claims for private nuisance, negligence, and trespass, despite the judge’s acknowledgement that there was “not a large number of detailed facts” set forth in the amended complaint.   However, the Court did dismiss claims for public nuisance and punitive damages. Read More »

An issue that insurers and industry have grappled with is whether a company can obtain environmental insurance coverage for costs to address violations of the Clean Air Act, when the costs at issue are aimed at curbing future air emissions, rather than remediating emissions that have already occurred.  Last week, one federal judge in Louisiana answered that question in the affirmative in La Gen Louisiana Gen. LLC, et al. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., Dkt. No. 3:10-cv-00516 (M.D. La., Aug. 5, 2015).  Read More »

Last summer we reported on Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314 (3rd Cir. 2013), a Third Circuit decision which held that the Clean Air Act does not preempt state law claims for personal and property damage caused by air pollutants.  And in March, we noted, not unsurprisingly, that defendant GenOn Power had filed a Petition for Cert to the U.S. Supreme Court.  On June 2, that Petition was denied, which may have been the impetus for the Supreme Court of Iowa to release its decison in Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., No. 13-0723 (June 13, 2014), holding that neither the Clean Air Act nor Iowa's analogous state act pre-empted similar state law claims.  The decision is a hefty one, providing a historical overview of the Clean Air Act and preemption law and an in-depth discussion leading to the Court's final determination.  Put this one aside for one evening when you're sitting in the recliner with a glass of wine at your side.   

This summer, we reported on the Third Circuit’s decision in the Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station case, which held that the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”) does not preempt state common law tort claims in a putative class action filed by over 1,500 residents complaining that the operations of GenOn Power Midwest, L.P.’s (“GenOn’s) coal-fired electric generation station constituted a nuisance under Pennsylvania common law.  Read More »

Yesterday, a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit issued a unanimous precedential opinion in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, No. 12-4216 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 2013), holding that the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”) does not preempt state common law tort claims.  In doing so, the Court reversed the Western District’s dismissal of the Complaint, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Read More »

Last Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit published two decisions in cases involving environmental groups’ challenges to EPA’s efforts to regulate certain classes of hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”).  Both cases concerned Section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act, a provision enacted by Congress in 1990 that requires EPA to (1) complete a list of sources of seven specified HAPs that accounts for at least ninety percent of the total emissions of each of the seven HAPs and (2) subject these listed sources to emissions standards.  42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(6).  Section 112(c)(6) gives EPA a choice among two emission standards:  (1) a stringent standard known as “maximum achievable control technology” (“MACT”) or (2) a standard based on health thresholds.  See § 112(c)(6), (d)(2) and (d)(4).  The cases decided last Friday highlight both procedural and substantive aspects of regulating air pollution. Read More »