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On June 23, 2023, in MRP Properties Company LLC v. United States, No. 22-1789, 2023 WL 4141227 (6th Cir. June 15, 2023), the Sixth Circuit decided that despite having directed production at refineries during World War II, the United States government did not qualify as an “operator” of those facilities under CERCLA, providing additional guidance for courts evaluating what kinds of activities subject a party to operator liability.  Read More »

In Sackett v. EPA, 2023 WL 3632751 (U.S. May 23, 2023), the Supreme Court limited the authority of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate wetlands by embracing a “continuous surface connection test” to determine if adjacent wetlands are subject to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and explicitly rejecting Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test from Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 754 (2006). While the 9-0 decision was unanimous in judgment by holding that the Sacketts’ wetland was not subject to federal jurisdiction, the court was sharply divided as to the test to determine when an adjacent wetland qualifies as a Water of the United States (or “WOTUS”).  A five-justice majority held that the CWA’s jurisdiction includes only adjacent wetlands that are indistinguishable from WOTUS due to a continuous surface connection. Under this framework, for an adjacent wetland to be subject to CWA jurisdiction, the adjacent body of water must constitute a WOTUS, and the adjacent wetland must have a continuous surface connection with the WOTUS such that it is difficult to determine where the body of water ends and the wetland begins.  The majority’s holding casts serious doubt on the continuing viability on the final WOTUS rule that became effective earlier this year and relied in part on the “significant nexus” test that EPA and the United States Army Corps have applied through guidance since the Rapanos decision. See 88 Fed. Reg. 3004 (Jan. 18, 2023). Read More »

On May 5, 2023 in Atlantic Richfield Company, et al. v. The County of Montgomery, Pennsylvania, No. 1338 C.D. 2021 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court rejected a novel attempt to hold paint manufacturers liable for lead paint in residential structures based on a public nuisance theory.  Read More »

On April 26, 2023, the United States Court of Federal Claims ordered the federal government to reimburse Shell U.S.A. and several other oil companies for all cleanup costs, including interest, associated with the cleanup of aviation gas (“avgas”) at a site polluted during World War II efforts. Shell U.S.A., Inc. et al. v. United States, 2023 WL 3090659 at *10 (Fed. Cl. 2023). This was the third such case in which the oil companies were seeking contractual indemnification for costs pursuant to the Contract Settlement Act and the only issue of significance addressed by the Court was whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to recover statutory interest that they previously paid under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). Ultimately, the Court held that the plain reading of CERCLA includes interest as a “charge,” and the government was not immune from paying those costs.  Id. at *8. Read More »

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. 9601, et seq., is best known for setting forth a comprehensive mechanism to cleanup hazardous waste sites under a restoration-based approach and for imposing liability on potentially responsible parties. What is less well known, and what is at issue in the latest decision to come out of litigation surrounding the 2015 Gold King Mine release, is CERCLA’s provisions that allow certain governmental entities who act as environmental trustees to recover money damages known as Natural Resource Damages (“NRDs”) from responsible parties for injuries to natural resources caused, directly or indirectly, from the release of hazardous substances, above and beyond the costs to clean up the contamination.  In In re Gold King Mine Release in San Juan Cnty., Colorado, on Aug. 5, 2015, No. 16-CV-931-WJ-LF, 2023 WL 2914718 (D. N.M. Apr. 12, 2023) (“In Re Gold Mine”), the Court held that CERCLA limited the Navajo Nation’s use of NRDs but also that CERCLA did not preempt state tort claims seeking restorative damages.  Read More »

Over the last week, pre-enforcement challenges to two separate federal government actions have been dismissed for lack of standing.  In Commonwealth of Kentucky et al. v. EPA, et al., No 3:23-cv-00007-GFVT, 2023 WL 2733383 (E.D. Ky. March 31, 2023), the Honorable Gregory F. Van Tatenhove of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed without prejudice claims brought by the Commonwealth of Kentucky (the “Commonwealth”) and private-sector plaintiffs challenging the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) and Army Corps of Engineers’ rule redefining “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act.  Five days later, in The State of Louisiana, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., et al., No. 22-30087, 2023 WL 2780821 (5th Cir. April 5, 2023), the Honorable Jacques L. Wiener, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed states’ challenges to President Biden’s social cost of greenhouse gases established pursuant to Executive Order No. 13990 (the “Executive Order”).  Both cases demonstrate the importance of alleging sufficient harm to confer federal court jurisdiction. Read More »

In September 2020, I wrote a Litigation Blog post about the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nanouk v. United States, 974 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2020), which considered whether the so-called discretionary function exception barred tort claims against the government in connection with its lengthy, haphazard cleanup of a PCB hotspot near a Cold War-era military installation in Alaska. As I explained in that article, the exception bars tort claims that are based on discretionary government conduct—often following a policy-based analysis—but not claims that are based on simple negligence by government officials.  Because cleanup protocols for such bases were generally grounded in economic and national security policy, the Ninth Circuit held the exception barred all claims asserted by the plaintiff, whose adjacent land was impacted by the PCBs, except one claim: that after deciding to undertake the cleanup in 1990, the government simply failed to do it for 13 years. The Court remanded that issue, instructing the government to proffer evidence showing that the delay in effectuating the cleanup was likewise policy based.  On remand, the trial court addressed this issue in denying without prejudice the United States' Motion to Dismiss.  Nanouk v. United States, Case No. 3:15-cv-00221-RRB (Mar. 15, 2023).    Read More »

EPA’s Clean Air Act (“CAA”) rulemakings directed at power plants are often the target of regulatory challenges in federal court.  EPA’s latest rulemaking regulating Hazardous Air Pollutant (“HAP”) emissions from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units (“EGUs”) is unlikely to be an exception. 88 Fed. Reg. 13956 (Mar. 6, 2023).  In the now final rule, EPA has revoked an earlier action taken in 2020, in which the agency declined to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs after comparing the costs of compliance relative to the benefits of regulation, relying at the time on the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015).  Id. at 13957; see also 85 Fed. Reg. 31286. Now, just three years later under a new administration, the agency has backtracked, finding that it is appropriate and necessary to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs based on new data regarding the costs and benefits of regulating HAP emissions.  EPA claims that its latest decision is actually more in line with the statutory factors identified in Michigan for determining whether it is “appropriate and necessary” to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs under the CAA. Read More »

That federal agencies enjoy numerous advantages in defending against legal challenges to their administrative decision-making is a fact of administrative law.  But these advantages extend beyond the favorable standards of review that typically apply to their decisions.  An agency can, for example, sometimes short circuit what might be a meritorious appeal by seeking a “voluntary remand” from the Court, thereby potentially affording itself more control over any reconsideration while avoiding creating unfavorable precedent.  As a reminder of this, the Sixth Circuit recently held that EPA was entitled to reconsider one of its Clean Air Act (CAA) rulemakings, namely its decision to remove the air nuisance rule (ANR), a broad standard that generally prohibited nuisance emissions that endangered the “health, safety, or welfare of the public,” from Ohio’s State Implementation Plan (SIP), without the Court vacating EPA’s underlying decision.  Sierra Club et al. v. EPA, No. 21-3057, 2023 WL 1873168, at * 1 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023).    Read More »

In In re LTL Management, LLC, No. 22-2003 (Jan. 30, 2023), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had occasion to consider whether an entity that was created solely to house liabilities and file for bankruptcy could, in fact, file for bankruptcy where another entity was contractually obligated to pay those liabilities. The Court dismissed the bankruptcy petition, reasoning that this contractual obligation meant the former entity was not in financial distress and thus could not avail itself of the bankruptcy process.    Read More »